Prefazione / Preface by Leone, Massimo
Lexia. Rivista di semiotica, 23–24
Complotto
ISBN 978-88-548-9931-5
DOI 10.4399/97888548993151
pag. 11–16 (giugno 2016)
Prefazione / Preface
M L*
Between  and , Rembrandt painted The Conspiracy of Claudius
Civilis, depicting a story from Tacitus’s Histories also known as “the
Batavian rebellion” (Fig. ).
According to the Roman historian, Civilis «collected at one of the
sacred groves, ostensibly for a banquet, the chiefs of the nation and the
boldest spirits of the lower class [. . . ] and bound the whole assembly
with barbarous rites and strange forms of oath». While acknowled-
ging the superior intelligence (for a native) of the Batavian leader,
Tacitus skillfully describes the assembly as a treacherous conspira-
cy: the secrecy of the reunion; the “barbarous” rites; the “strange”
forms of oath; etc. In transposing into a painting this verbal imagery
of secrecy and deviance, Rembrandt offers one of the first modern
instances of visual conspiracy theory: the chromatic tonalities of the
canvas transmit the impression of a scene immersed in dim light,
horizontally traversed by the luminous line of the massive table on
which the “strange” oaths are being uttered. Reddle hues predominate
all around, on the wall in the background as well as in the garments of
many conjurers, presenting the viewer of the painting with an image
that exudes the chromatic promise of blood to be treacherously shed.
Figures of conspiracy, then, abound: surly gazes converge toward
the symbolical core of the scene, the crossing of blades initiated by
Civilis, but all around and at the margins of the scene also cups of
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 July  — Amsterdam, Dutch Republic (now the Netherlands),  October .
. Oil on canvas;  cm ×  cm; Stockholm, Nationalmuseum.
. Publius (o Gaius) Cornelius Tacitus; Gallia Narbonensis (currently South of France),
– — Rome, –.
. Historiae, c. –.
. .–; Engl. trans. W.H. Fyfe ().
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Figure . Rembrandt (–) The Conspiracy of Claudius Civilis, oil on canvas, 
cm ×  cm, Stockholm, Nationalmuseum.
wine are raised, as though to hint at the inevitable intoxication of
conspiracy. One figure among all particularly stands out: following
Tacitus’s physiognomy, which is meant to parallel the face of Civilis
with that of other rebels and enemies of Rome (Sertorius, Hannibal,
etc.), Rembrandt directs all the topology of the scene toward the
sinister mono–eyed face of the leader, immobile in an expression of
poisonous resolution.
Rembrandt’s painting should be visually kept in mind by all those
who share a concern (be it scholarly or political, or both) for conspira-
cy theories. Since the Roman antiquity, and certainly even before, the
plans of action of enemy forces have been described and depicted not
simply as plain prefiguration of acts, but as treacherous conniving, held
in secret and cemented by unknown, barbaric rituals. “Constructing
the enemy” often implies, through history, the projection and pro-
paganda of an imaginary in which what is hostile is also dangerously
and barbarically secret.
In his visual wisdom, Rembrandt could not overlook the symbo-
lical importance of the detail handed down by Tacitus: the only eye
that Civilis opens on the scene of the conspiracy. What does this only
eye mean? Certainly, it bestows a certain monstrosity on the face of
the Batavian leader, thus contributing to depict him as an alien force
in society, as a traitor and as a conjurer. However, the only eye also
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underlines that which the visual conspiracy theory sees in the sup-
posed mentality of conspirators: the uni–directionality of their gazes;
the fact that, unlike “normal” people in society, they do not look at
the whole of reality but select into it a single line, the project that will
lead to their triumph and to the consequent disruption of society.
But again, is this mono–eyed character of conspiracies an intrinsic one
or is it rather the denigrating feature that an opposite ideology attaches
to any collective project likely to engender it? Is the conspiracy in the
only eye of Civilis or rather in the only eye that Rembrandt’s painting,
and Tacitus’s history before him, lends to the spectators, forcing them
to perceive Civilis and his acolytes as a gang of dangerous conspirators?
One of the philosophically most interesting aspects of the area of
study tentatively called “conspiracy theories” is that it presents itself
as inexorably and paradoxically multi–leveled: there is the supposed
conspiracy in history, such as that of Civilis who wants to overthrow
the Roman yoke and federates all allied forces around him through
binding rituals; there is the supposed visual conspiracy theory, which
attributes a pernicious intention to the gathering of enemies, depic-
ting it with monstrous and treacherous features; but there is also the
meta–level of the scholar who, by analyzing Tacitus’s historical text or
Rembrandt’s visual rendering of it, considers them part of a broader
and more encompassing conspiracy, meant at discrediting an enemy
faction. However, why not complicating further this superposition,
and surmise that scholars too are part of an even broader conspiracy,
which surreptitiously aims at seeding doubt in the customary, predo-
minant account of history, a sort of revisionism that relativizes the
perspective of the winner and revaluates, for political purposes, the
gaze of the defeated ones, showing that they were not conspirators
but “freedom fighters”? Why, for instance, in recounting the history of
Italian Risorgimento — the historical process that led to the indepen-
dence of the current Italian state — Italians do not talk of conspiracy
when dealing with “carboneria”, the secret insurgent movements that
eventually defeated the Austro-Hungarian domain?
That is one of the main challenges that students of “conspiracy
theories” must face: can we look at them with both eyes, and realize that
they all share some intrinsic logical features, as the very first creators
of the expression “conspiracy theory” (Popper, etc.) believed? Is there
an inherently logical fallacy in conspiracy theories? Or, on the contrary,
 Prefazione / Preface
are we doomed to look at conspiracy with one eye only, as we were
the symmetrical counterpart of Civilis, forced to see conspiracy or
conspiracy theories every time that plans of actions, or the theoretical
account of them, does not align with our ideology and desires?
The essays collected in this monographic issue of Lexia do not
cultivate the wild ambition to solve this riddle once and for all. They
rather seek to cast a fresh look at the issue of conspiracy, conspiracy
thought, and conspiracy theories, through combining semiotics and
other qualitative methods. Whereas the essays take distinct stances
as regards the logical sustainability of such or such theories, they
all share a common concern in trying to pinpoint the conditions in
which conspiratorial thinking proliferates: financial and economic
crises entailing major disruptions of the labor market and massive
unemployment; the reconfiguration of social and communicative
relations though the rapid evolution of unprecedented digital media;
the consequent shifting of political models; above all, the radical
change of the meaning of social relations, not only those among
people but also those among facts: when the socio–semiotic system of
ties that binds the elements of reality together and shapes them into
a more or less coherent semiosphere starts to disintegrate, the result
is often the emerging of a myriad of ideological contrapositions that
feed, in their turn, the various levels and meta–levels of conspiratorial
thought. On the one hand, anti–system political leaders promote
the emergence of a new representation of reality, in which occult
conspiratorial forces are finally unmasked; on the other hand, pro–
system agencies see a conspiracy in the conspiracy thoughts of their
adversary or denigrate them as mere illogical fantasies.
For instance, there seems to be no point of contact between those
who believe that the importance of vaccines is artificially inflated by
conspiratorial pharmaceutical companies and those who call these
theories “conspiracies”, or even accuse them of being part of a politi-
cal conspiracy aimed at subverting the democratic arena and taking
possession of it through heterodox and often violent rhetorical means.
Nevertheless, the lack of this point of contact has not a logical but a
semiotic nature. It is not through ‘scientifically’ demonstrating that
the former are wrong and the latter are right, or vice versa, that this
dividing trend in society will disappear. It would be foolish to believe
that people disagree and fight with each other because they believe in
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discrepant conspiracy theories; on the opposite, one has often the im-
pression that people believe in discrepant conspiracy theories exactly
because they want to disagree. They want to somehow vehicle and
also give vent to the tension that underlies society, and that does not
find other semiotic frameworks of expression.
Therefore, if the work of semioticians on conspiracy theories has
a purpose whatsoever, is not that of indicating, from a supposedly
superior vantage point, who is right and who is wrong, who is con-
spiring and who is not, who is creating a fake conspiracy theory and
who is unveiling a dangerous social secret. The purpose of semiotics
is, rather, that of indicating the discursive conditions that encourage
the proliferation of such conspiratorial or anti–conspiratorial thinking,
and simultaneously also the more difficult purpose of suggesting how
to reframe conflict in a different discursive framework, one that does
not simply create rhetorical conflict but casts the basis for social ac-
tion. For example, the problem of conspiracy theories on vaccines,
from a semiotic point of view, lies not in their supposed logical or
scientific fallacy, but in the fact that they are a means to voice a so-
cial preoccupation that would, otherwise, remain unexpressed, that is,
anguish toward the increasing deconstruction of scientific and also
medical knowledge in the new digital arenas. Semioticians and other
social scholars should, therefore, operate not for the debunking of
such supposed conspiracy theories, but for the creation of a collective
space in which the evident confusion of present–day digital scientific
communication could be raised as a problem, discussed, and possibly
redirected toward more convenient solutions.
As it has been pointed out by art historians, Rembrandt’s canvas
contains an odd detail. There is one more sword in the painting than
Batavians holding them. Rembrandt often introduced such bizarre,
visually illogical clue in his paintings (for instance, the double “right
hand” in The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp, ) so as to sti-
mulate a meta–reading of them. In this case, interpretation is quite
open, but one direction for it could be the following: in depicting
a famous conspiracy, and in visually interpreting the historical con-
spiracy theory of Tacitus, Rembrandt detached himself from it by
visually suggesting, through the presence of this extra sword, that
conspiracy often contains an element of violence that cannot directly
and univocally be attributed to an agent. We see the conspiracy with
 Prefazione / Preface
the mono–eyed point of view that ideology, the Histories of Tacitus,
and Rembrandt’s political clients lend to the viewer of the canvas; it
is a mono–eyed point of view that mirrors the mono–eyed vision of
the supposed conspirator ad infinitum. And yet, in these reflections
of accusations and hostilities, Rembrandt drops a puzzling semiotic
clue: what if this contraposition was actually the result of a sword that
is there but that nobody holds; a sword that is a symbol of unnamed
violence, circulating through society and calling for conspiracies and
anti–conspiracies while remaining completely anonymous? Such is,
perhaps, the most precious suggestion that, with usual irony, Rem-
brandt offers for the study of the subject of conspiracy: do not look
at who supposedly holds the sword, but concentrate, rather, on the
sword that nobody holds, and that nevertheless remains there, in the
center of the scene, instigating violence and counter–violence, con-
spiracies and accusations of conspiracies, divisions and enmities, until
someone (a painter, a semiotician) will be lucid enough to ask the
fundamental question: “but really, why are we fighting?”
The articles of the collection are divided into three broad sec-
tions, “Semiotics of Conspiracy”; “Geographies of Conspiracy”, and
“Themes of Conspiracy”. Most of them were presented at the two
symposia that the University of Potsdam (Prof. Eva Kimminich) and
the University of Turin (Prof. Massimo Leone) organized respectively
in March –,  and June, –, . Our deepest gratitude goes to
all those who took part in these events or contributed to their organi-
zation. Our moved thoughts go also to Umberto Eco, who accepted
to participate in a roundtable at the end of the Turin event, and to give
a lectio magistralis on conspiracy theories on the occasion of the laurea
ad honorem that was conferred to him on the same day.
Some other articles were received and selected through an inter-
national call for papers. All contributions went through double–blind
peer–reviewing and editorial reading.
Both the volume and the symposia benefited from a DAAD grant,
in the framework called “Hochschuldialog mit Südeuropa” (). We
thank the DAAD for such generous support, as well as the administra-
tive staff of the Universities of Potsdam and Turin that so effectively
worked for its management.
